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Rethinking Individuals and Agents in Archaeology
Archaeologists who seek to examine people’s roles in past societies have long assumed, 
consciously or unconsciously, the existence of individuals. In this study, we explore various 
concepts and dimensions of ‘the individual’, both ethnographic and archaeological. We show 
that many protagonists in the debate over the existence of ‘individuals’ in prehistory use 
the same ethnographic examples to argue their positions. These positions range from the 
claim that any suggestion of individuals prior to 500 years ago simply projects a construct 
of western modernity onto the past, to the view that individual identities are culturally 
specific social constructs, both past and present. Like most contributors to the debate, we 
too are sceptical of an unchanging humanity in the past, but we feel that thinking on the 
topic has become somewhat inflexible. As a counterpoint to this debate, therefore, we discuss 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus in association with Foucault’s notion of power. We conclude 
that experiencing oneself as a living individual is part of human nature, and that archaeolo-
gists should reconsider the individual’s social, spatial and ideological importance, as well 
as the existence of individual, embodied lives in prehistoric as well as historical contexts.
and ‘postprocessual’ (e.g. Shanks & Tilley 1987, 61–78; 
Meskell 1999, 8–36; Hodder 2000; 2003; Tarlow 2002, 
26–7; Gosden 2004, 33–9; Kristiansen 2004, 83–5), 
archaeologists who want to open up windows onto 
the roles people played in past societies typically 
assume, consciously or unconsciously, the existence 
of individuals.
Thomas (2004a, 147–8), however, challenges 
unqualified assumptions about the existence of indi-
viduals, at least in Europe prior to about 500 years ago:
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The result [of recent work on agency] … has been to 
conflate agency with the actor … and thus to assume 
that evidence of agency is the same thing as evidence 
for individuals or subjects or selves. This confusion 
is an understandable one, and in archaeology its 
origins would seem to lie in the wholly necessary 
and laudable attempt to think about the concrete 
attributes of individuals in the past and their role in 
social and cultural change. (Moore 2000, 260)
On the surface of archaeological method and theory 
today, and given the current fascination of many 
archaeologists with the concept of ‘agency’, there 
might seem to be little reason to challenge this 
straightforward statement by Henrietta Moore. From 
the earliest, in-depth archaeological treatment of The 
Individual in Prehistory (Hill & Gunn 1977), to its recent 
re-visitation in a thoroughly overcrowded session at 
the American Anthropological Association’s 100th 
annual meeting (Twenty-five Years after the Individual in 
Prehistory, New Orleans, 21 November 2002), through 
a wide range of writings both ‘processual’ (e.g. Ren-
frew 1972, 503–4; Hayden 2001, 254–8; Snow 2002) 
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… to impose the concept of the individual on the dis-
tant past is a dangerous and potentially narcissistic 
exercise. … If personhood is relational, we should 
explore the relationships that enable humanity to 
create and sustain itself in the past, and attempt 
to distinguish what that humanity was like, rather 
than presume that the transcendental individual has 
always stood at the centre of everything.
In his view, the concept of the modern individual has 
become lodged in the ‘archaeological imagination’ 
(Thomas 1996, 63–4). He has long argued (1) that 
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this ‘rational’ or ‘autonomous’ or ‘transcendental’ 
individual is a cultural construct unique to western 
modernity and its most characteristic political philoso-
phy — humanistic liberalism, and (2) that projecting 
this ‘phantom individual’ onto the past is not just 
anachronistic but indeed an ethnocentric distortion 
of the past (Thomas 2002a, 30; 2004a, 136–7). Even 
historical archaeologists, like Martin Hall (2000, 9–10), 
feel that by assuming an unchanging humanity in the 
past, we open ourselves up to circular interpretations 
and make our historical enquiries self-serving.
In large measure, Fowler (2004, 3–6) follows 
Thomas’s lead, maintaining that people in the past 
were not necessarily as ‘individualized’ as modern 
people are, and that past notions of personhood and 
identity would have been closely tied to context (just 
as they are today) and intimately related to social 
interactions and community concerns. Kirk (2006, 
333–5) is less sanguine and, in discussing contingent 
senses (i.e. unfixed, non-stable through time) of 
personhood that may have been constituted through 
various material practices played out at some early 
Neolithic monuments in southern Britain, does not 
deny the possibility that some ‘historically-specific’ 
forms of the individual may have existed in the past. 
In examining the Neolithic of southeastern Europe, 
Chapman (2000) developed an anthropological model 
of ‘personhood’ to consider how processes of fragmen-
tation and accumulation link people and objects. In his 
view, persons — not individuals but ‘dividuals’ — are 
made up of the sum total of their relationships. Jones 
(2005) cast his net more widely, examining the broader 
European Neolithic and considering how the person 
was constituted during this transformational period. 
He suggests that personhood is a relational concept 
of central importance to understanding the European 
Neolithic overall, and that we must take care not to 
totalize either the individual or the ‘dividual’. Jones’s 
engaging study focuses upon social practices, the 
ways in which persons are produced and performed 
through networks of relationships — differing in 
each historical context and involving both people and 
materiality.
In many respects, this body of research on Neo-
lithic Europe and Britain has tended to shift the focus 
of the debate from individuals to persons, or person-
hood, concepts we discuss in some detail below. In this 
study, our aim is to explore and seek to minimize the 
still polar positions about the existence of individuals 
in the past. We discuss first various concepts and 
dimensions of ‘the individual’ (including person-
hood), citing some ethnographic and social science 
issues that have influenced archaeological thinking on 
this topic. We then consider how archaeologists, and 
in particular prehistorians, have used the concept of 
the individual, and the differences that have ensued. 
Like Thomas, we do not use a specific case study or 
studies to illustrate our points, but we cite several 
relevant publications that do.
On closer inspection, the often acrimonious 
debate conducted in the writings of Lynn Meskell and 
Julian Thomas in particular reveals common threads 
of misunderstanding, some of it interdisciplinary in 
nature (ethnographic vs archaeological) and some 
intra-disciplinary (processual vs postprocessual, ‘Euro-
pean’ vs ‘Mediterranean’ archaeologies). We show here 
that the main protagonists use the same ethnographic 
examples to argue their positions, and suggest that 
the resulting divisions are somewhat superficial. As 
a counterpoint, one we find relevant in this debate, 
we discuss the connections between agency and 
power and, taking our lead from Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus, together with Foucault’s notion of power, 
we propose an alternative to the entire debate. In 
conclusion, we suggest that experiencing oneself as 
a living individual is part of human nature, and that 
archaeologists should reconsider the social, spatial 
and ideological importance of the individual and of 
individual embodied lives in the past. We contend 
that this does not amount to embracing the modern 
concept of the individual, or individualism, as long 
as we allow the relevant prehistoric and historical 
contexts to be part of the equation.
Individuals: concepts and dimensions
Because western social science typically proceeds 
from (the greater) society to (the lesser) person or indi-
vidual, most archaeologists have followed suit, and 
have long ignored the relationship of the individual to 
society, or the position and relations of persons within 
society. Instead they have tended to treat individuals, 
or persons, in systems-theoretical terms as merely 
the smallest constituent parts of a larger system that 
has its own dynamics and follows its own logic, one 
that individuals cannot influence. Amongst the few 
processual archaeologists who attempted to make 
more of these ‘individuals’ are Hill & Gunn (1977), but 
their insistence on the systemic nature of individual 
behaviour within wider social, economic and other 
contexts effectively turned persons into miniature 
systems (Thomas 2004a, 116–17 & 120–21). Of course, 
there are exceptions to this trend in the social sci-
ences: some Darwinian archaeologists, evolutionary 
ecologists and behavioural biologists, amongst others, 
regard individuals — often in an under-theorized 
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sense — as the basic building blocks of social theory 
(e.g. Nettle 1997).
Schortman (1989), an archaeologist who attempted 
to swim against the processual tide, developed the 
concept of ‘salient identities’ in an early, insightful 
paper sympathetic to the notion of individuals but 
ultimately treating wider social categories — ethnicity 
and class. Salient identities refer to social affiliations 
that guide cultural and interpersonal behaviour and 
have multiple material signifiers (Schortman 1989, 
54–5). One crucial implication is that such identi-
ties typically are multiple, invoked under different 
circumstances and for diverse reasons during a 
person’s lifetime. Most people, in fact, must negotiate 
multiple and divergent, even conflicting identities 
throughout their life experience (Fisher & Di Paolo 
Loren 2003, 226).
In considering a wide range of material media 
— from monuments, figurines and frescoes to 
iconography and stylistic motifs to jewellery and 
ornamentation — archaeologists regularly treat 
issues related to posture, gesture, costume, sexual-
ity, representation and experience. Only recently, 
however, have they attempted to (re)construct indi-
viduals, individual identities and personhood, or 
to engage with individual bodies and actual bodily 
experience on the basis of such material evidence 
(e.g. Meskell 1999; 2001; Gillespie 2001; Joyce 2003; 
Meskell & Joyce 2003). Postprocessual archaeologies 
generally have emphasized human intentionality and 
paid lip service to studying the individual, but in 
practice ‘real people’ (Johnson 1989, 189–90) seldom 
make an appearance. The presentation of ‘individu-
als’ in archaeology, and particularly in prehistory, 
is more often implicit than explicit. More serious is 
the pessimism that leads at least one archaeologist 
to argue: ‘Although all the material we deal with was 
made, used and discarded by individual people, we 
see them only as part of a collective, often a time-
transgressive collective of considerable duration’ 
(Frankel 2005, 24).
Accessing the individual in material culture 
obviously poses real challenges to archaeologists, 
not least because the concept of the individual is a 
loaded, historically-situated term (Shanks & Tilley 
1987, 62). The material record cannot ‘prove’ that 
people in prehistory held a concept of themselves 
as individuals, even if the material conditions of 
individual people are represented in media such as 
architecture, rock art, clay and stone figurines, frescoes 
and pottery, or reflected in everything from stone tools 
(Dobres 2000) to monuments (Brück 2001; Kirk 2006) 
to skeletal remains (Robb 2002). Despite the practical 
and theoretical issues that complicate any definition of 
analytical or real individuals in a prehistoric context, 
we believe it is necessary to move beyond attempts 
simply to identify social groups or categories, or to 
break them down into opposing binary classifications, 
or to argue that they are only modern reconstructions 
cast in our own image (cf. Latour 1993). Instead we 
need to seek better resolution of specific individuals 
or persons, embodied lives and representations of 
relational selves, not least because individuals are, 
and were, intimately implicated in maintaining and 
transforming social structures, values and practices. 
Moreover, as argued below, the concept of habitus 
not only provides some leverage for recognizing 
non-western notions of personhood, it also enables us 
to understand that ‘western’ personhood is itself plu-
ralistic: as a result, dividing western and non-western 
notions of personhood, or of individuals, is not very 
useful conceptually.
When archaeologists discuss concepts related to 
the individual or the person, typically they use four 
terms — person, individual, identity and self (or bet-
ter, selfhood). Because Meskell (1999, 32–3) and others 
(e.g. La Fontaine 1985; Tarlow 2002, 26; Fowler 2004, 
7–9) have defined and expanded upon these terms 
in light of the anthropological literature, we simply 
summarize them here.
The individual, as the primary focus of study, 
is the physical, mortal human being, and hence 
one aspect for which archaeologists do have direct 
evidence. The person is one who has been ascribed 
with social status or ‘selfhood’, i.e. any human being 
who may be conceptualized and treated as a person 
(Fowler 2004, 7). In effect, individuality — based on 
our unique, current western conception — transforms 
this social person into a rational social agent. Each 
person, in turn, has an identity, or rather several 
identities that may or may not converge and that 
constitute the person in the context of the society or 
the groups of which s/he is part. Self(hood), finally, 
represents the collected attributes of a person, the 
‘site’ or perspective from which a person perceives 
the surrounding world and acts upon and within 
it (Mauss 1985 [1938]). Fowler (2004, 7), followed 
largely by Jones (2005) and Kirk (2006), uses the term 
‘personhood’ instead of selfhood, defining it as a 
person’s state of being in any specific context. He also 
adds as key features of personhood ‘dividuality’ and 
‘partibility’, derived from Strathern’s (1988) study of 
the composite, multiply-authored, divisible persons 
in Highland New Guinea society (Fowler 2004, 8–9). 
Clearly none of these terms is fixed, especially in the 
ways that archaeologists have used them. Moreover, 
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and in any case, all of them are interlinked in lived, 
bodily experience (Meskell 1999, 32).
Archaeologists have also treated no less than 
five dimensions or notions of the ‘person’ or the ‘indi-
vidual’ (Meskell 1999, 34–6). Briefly stated these are: 
1. the self-inscribed, cultural concept of the individual, 
which effectively concerns the ways that people in 
the past may have conceived of themselves;
2. the anonymous individual or individual bodies, 
as encountered for instance in mortuary and 
especially skeletal evidence or represented by 
prehistoric figurines;
3. individuals as distinguished through their actions 
as artists or craftspeople, or through their use of 
technological styles, in effect the original under-
standing of the ‘individual in prehistory’ as pro-
posed by Hill & Gunn (1977; cf. Conkey & Hastorf 
1990);
4. representations of individuals in iconography, 
architecture or documentary evidence, such as 
figurines, burial monuments, frescoes, lists of 
weavers or metalworkers attached to a palace, 
medieval nuns;
5. historically known individuals such as Sumerian 
kings, the Egyptian villagers of Deir el Medina, 
Greek philosophers or Roman satirists.
The last two categories of the individual, from proto-
historic or historically documented societies, may 
seem prima facie more accessible and readily verifiable, 
but that does not preclude the study of people as indi-
viduals through the use of exclusively material data. 
Moreover, and of crucial importance for the following 
discussion, with the possible exception of the last 
(fifth) category, it seems to us that such people — and 
their personhood or individuality — have nothing 
to do with contemporary fixations on individualism 
(privacy, personal relations and feelings) (Fowler 
2004, 17), much less with the Thatcherite, neo-liberal, 
‘autonomous individuals’ that haunt Thomas (2002a, 
34–8) and typify the ‘humanistic’ tradition that so 
concerns him.
Individuals in archaeology
Defining and understanding individuals has always 
been seen as more of a challenge in prehistory, and 
perhaps most obviously in its earliest stages where, 
for example, the refitting of flint fragments often 
enables archaeologists to reconstruct the specific acts 
of one or more persons producing chipped stone 
tools. Yet from diverse backgrounds and multiple 
geographic or chronological areas of focus, prehis-
torians increasingly discuss the various dimensions 
of individuals, persons and identities as they may 
be seen in the material record. McDermott (1996), for 
example, argues that European Upper Palaeolithic 
female figurines were attempts at self-representation, 
whilst Duhard (1990; 1993) suggests that each figurine 
may have represented an actual individual, or person. 
Sinclair (2000) links the Solutrean (Upper Palaeolithic) 
lithic technology of southern France and Iberia to an 
artistry and ‘boldness’ that reveal discrete individu-
als’ actions instrumental in creating and maintaining 
social identities. Combining landscape studies with 
an embodied approach, Last (1998) presents the 
biographies of individual bodies uncovered in a 
Bronze Age Cambridgeshire cemetery. Using human 
representations in Moche art to consider how male 
and female bodies were differently treated in ritual 
sacrifices, Hill (2000) argues that males (as prisoners) 
were represented anonymously in groups, whilst 
all women (as sacrifices) were represented singly, as 
individuals who may have played specific roles in 
Moche rituals. Jones (2005, 196–9) usefully summa-
rizes further Mesoamerican and Andean accounts of 
persons and personhood.
In her study of human figurines and burials in 
Neolithic Greece, Talalay (1993; 2000, 4–5) argues that 
production and exchange in this primarily egalitarian 
society involved (anonymous) individual men and 
women, whether potters, peddlers or pastoral herd-
ers. Amongst the remains of more than 400 skeletons 
from the Italian Neolithic, Robb (2002, 162–5) estab-
lishes a detailed ‘osteobiography’ of one individual 
female, from birth to death and all the traumas she 
suffered in between. Renfrew (1994, 167–70; 2001, 
135) links the beginnings of metallurgical produc-
tion in Bronze Age Europe and the Aegean to the 
emergence of socially distinct individuals, identifi-
able by their actions as evident in symbolic mortuary 
displays of weaponry (Europe), or by high-prestige 
commodities (the Aegean). In a related study, Tre-
herne (1995) maintains that the (masculine) toilet 
articles and armaments that appear at a particular 
moment in European prehistory are related to the 
increasing sense of individuality associated with 
the rise and transformation of an elite male warrior 
group. Broodbank (2000, 170–74) argues that a high 
incidence of single burials, along with the growing 
frequency of elaborately painted figurines showing 
unusual forms or attributes, signals the increas-
ing archaeological visibility of individuals in the 
Cycladic Early Bronze Age. Frankel (1991, 247–9) 
and Cherry (1992) discuss individual artists, respec-
tively on prehistoric Cyprus and in the Bronze Age 
Aegean, whilst the reconstruction of skulls from a 
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Middle Minoan ‘shrine’ at Archanes-Anemospilia in 
Crete suggest ‘... important and striking individuals, 
marked out both by their physique and their posses-
sions’ (Musgrave et al. 1994, 89) — one example of 
anonymous individual bodies.
From a more theoretical perspective, Shanks & 
Tilley (1987, 62–3) speculated that ‘[t]here has prob-
ably never been a society which did not recognize the 
individual subject by such means as naming or being 
able to differentiate between and perceive physical 
bodies’, and the ethnographic case-studies referred 
to by all contributors to the debate support this point. 
Shanks & Tilley go on to caution, however, that the 
actual concepts of individuals (‘personages’) will vary 
from one society to another, and that our modern 
western concept of the person is ‘a rather peculiar 
idea’. In the latest revision of a now-classic textbook 
on theory and interpretation in archaeology, Hodder 
& Hutson (2003, 121–4) also recognize that the concept 
of the individual is complex, and discuss it in terms of 
embodiment and the relational self (see also Hodder 
2000, 25). Meskell (1999, 8–36), developing argu-
ments adumbrated in earlier studies (Meskell 1996; 
1998; Knapp & Meskell 1997), discusses at length the 
concept of the individual, both in the social sciences 
generally and in archaeology specifically. She outlines 
the historical trajectories and ontological necessity in 
the study of the self and as they concern the emergence 
of individuals, social actors and social identities in 
the material and documentary records (Meskell 
2001, 188–95). Wilkie & Bartoy (2000, 755, 771) draw 
a clear line of demarcation between the individual 
and ‘individualism’, on the one hand, and on the 
other recognize that a dialectical relationship between 
society and the individual is crucial for understanding 
better the complexities of social life.
Thomas (2002a; 2004a,b) has persistently cri-
tiqued any and all of these attempts to use the concept 
of the individual in archaeology, and is not satisfied 
with the distinctions many scholars make between 
‘the western conception of the autonomous sovereign 
individual’ and individualism, because he sees both as 
specifically western notions, even if created at different 
times (2004a, 139). Note, however, that in the passage 
cited at the outset of this study, Thomas (2004a, 147–8) 
himself moves from the ‘concept of the individual’ to 
‘personhood’ to the ‘transcendental individual’, fail-
ing to distinguish clearly between them. He feels that 
several studies which have focused on the concept 
of the individual in society, or on the relationship 
between the individual and society, have reified these 
constructs as distinctive and autonomous entities in 
which individuals are seen to draw on social structure 
or else to have a relationship with society, rather than 
seeing both individual and society as inseparable 
(Thomas 2004b, 121).
Thomas has delved more deeply than most 
other archaeologists into the philosophical and 
social science underpinnings of the notion of the 
individual, and we do not dispute his attempt to 
challenge the notion of a fixed, universal human 
nature. Indeed, given the pervasiveness of ‘meth-
odological individualism’ in some areas of sociology, 
classical or neo-liberal economic theory, and neo-
Darwinian archaeologies, we are in accord with his 
stance against liberal humanism. Nor do we have 
any problem in upholding his view that archaeolo-
gists cannot and should not presume that all people 
who lived in the past were individuals ‘just like us’ 
(Thomas 2004a, 144). Nonetheless it seems to us that 
Thomas repeatedly and often repetitiously seeks 
to ratify his position and will brook no opposition 
(e.g. in reviews and comments such as Thomas 
2000b; 2002b). And, whilst we too abhor the kind of 
right-wing liberalism that underpins neoconserva-
tive ideologies and ‘futurologies’ (Fukuyama 2006), 
we feel that Thomas is reluctant to look beyond the 
philosophical and political bases of his position, and 
categorically dismisses the existence of individuals 
in a wide range of social contexts the world around, 
from earliest prehistory to historically-based eras. 
As a result, he has castigated rather perfunctorily an 
extensive body of work beyond prehistoric Britain 
and Europe, and has failed to come to grips with the 
terminology and definitions that archaeologists and 
anthropologists alike have employed and developed 
in arguments related to the individual (see previous 
section). Despite repeated denials, it seems to us, as 
it did to Wilkie & Bartoy (2000, 771), that Thomas 
persistently tends to read other people’s use of the 
term ‘individual’ as ‘individualism’. In turn, this has 
led both Thomas and others (in particular, Meskell) 
to adopt somewhat intractable stances in the debate 
over individuals in archaeology and to lose sight of 
the subtleties and nuances they all advocate.
Given his insistence that both notions — indi-
viduals and individualism — constitute specifically 
and indeed exclusively western constructs, albeit of 
different periods and contexts, Thomas is unlikely 
to deny this contention. We therefore suggest that 
it is his claim, maintaining that any appreciation of 
‘individuals’ is an exclusively western stance, which 
lies at the heart of this controversy. Before we delve 
deeper into the theoretical roots and implications of 
his position, however, we first sketch the outlines of 
this debate in archaeology.
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Individuals in archaeology: contours of a debate
Interestingly, both Thomas and Meskell use the same 
ethnographic cases — from Strathern’s (1988) study 
of gender in Melanesian society — to argue their 
opposing points of view (Chapman, Fowler, Jones and 
Kirk also discuss Strathern’s work to various degrees). 
Thomas (2002a, 34) maintains that the concept of 
‘individuality’ is incomprehensible in the Melanesian 
situation, where ‘dividual’ identities emerge from 
various pre-existing relationships, and persons are 
conceptualized only as amalgams or hybrids of dif-
ferent relations and substances. Meskell (1999, 33), 
in contrast, points out that a person in Hagen, Papua 
New Guinea, may be seen as an embodied set of 
internal relations, with each person being part of a 
multiple, or partible composition. In Strathern’s (1988, 
273) view, personhood is a relational state whilst the 
person is construed from the perspectives of the rela-
tions that make up the individual. For Thomas (2002a, 
34), Strathern is arguing that individual agency can 
only be understood in relational terms, and that one 
person’s actions can only be seen in terms of anoth-
er’s: the corollary is that ‘… no aspect of identity or 
embodiment is sufficiently knowable for universality 
to be established’. For Meskell (1999, 33), Strathern 
is describing ‘… multiple selves that are aspects of 
individual persons’: the corollary is that agents act 
within relationships and are revealed as a result of 
those actions.
Pointing out one way toward a possible reso-
lution, Bachand et al. (2003, 239) maintain that ‘… 
personhood took the form not of the autonomous and 
disconnected individuals of contemporary methodo-
logical individualism, but of relational selves’. Similar 
arguments from the pen of Li Puma (1998) have been 
discussed by Thomas (2004a, 124–35), Gosden (2004, 
33–5), Fowler (2004, 34–6), Jones (2005, 194–6) and 
Kirk (2006, 333–5). The materialization of an embodied 
individual is realized through interpersonal social 
actions, and the individual person is composed of mul-
tiple natural and cultural materials, brought together 
in a specific time and place by the accumulated acts 
and relations of other social beings, be they ancestors, 
elders, family members, craftspeople, masters, serv-
ants or slaves (Joyce 2000, 185–6). If the protagonists 
in the debate accepted these points, their perspectives 
might be seen less in opposition than as contrasts, or 
points along a spectrum of interpretation that could 
help in framing a concept of individuals as a negotia-
tion between differing social and personal concerns.
Thomas, however, insists that we cannot 
establish the universality of individual identity and 
claims instead that we must accept the universal-
ity of (Foucauldian) power relations, recognizing 
that people are different (or at least have different 
identities?) as a result of the ways they position 
themselves within networks of domination, resistance 
and knowledge (Thomas 2002a, 37–8; 2004b, 24–5). 
Thomas thus situates himself squarely in the realm 
of a ‘Foucauldian archaeology’ that Meskell (1996; 
1999, 30–31) has criticized for its binary equation of 
oppressor vs oppressed, especially as this relates to 
issues of sex and class. Tarlow (1999, 175) also has 
excoriated the way that archaeologists (e.g. Shanks 
& Tilley 1982) have privileged power relations in 
considering mortuary practices, viewing this as a 
cynical interpretation of human behaviour that takes 
insufficient account of individual people’s motivations 
and experiences. Sweely (1999, 2) points out that most 
archaeological analyses of power focus primarily on 
institutional forms and ideological structures rather 
than on the individuals affected by them. Foucault 
himself recognized and indeed insisted on the impact 
of power in all social relations. Even if he was more 
concerned with institutional than with individual 
discourses on power, he was firmly committed to the 
ubiquitous and all-pervasive role of power in social 
relations. Foucault, in any case, was no less part of 
the modernist discourse than the views that Thomas 
criticizes.
Excepting the most extreme instances of domi-
nation, power relations are historically contingent, 
negotiable and amenable to individual interests. To 
examine power relations amongst individuals, we 
may view them as a ‘dialogic’ interaction (Bakhtin 
1981), where centripetal forces shape and continually 
recreate the meanings and terms of power, and where, 
in turn, power relations impact individual lived 
experience through the engagement, negotiation and 
manipulation of difference (Moore 1994, 71–5). Equally, 
and in seeking to disentangle opposing perceptions 
of the institutionalized and individualized realms 
and relations of power, Moore (1999, 13–14) observes: 
‘… it is not enough to focus on fragmentation and 
particularism; there has to be some acknowledgment 
that hierarchical relations of power and domination 
set a larger context within which the particularities of 
lives are lived’ (see also Cheater 1999, 7–9).
We can see no clear difference between Moore’s 
observations and Thomas’s statement that ‘[p]ower 
is not simply an external force that bears down upon 
us; it is the set of possibilities immanent in the social 
and material relationships in which we are engaged’ 
(2004b, 34). Maintaining a Foucauldian stance, how-
ever, Thomas believes that only by considering issues 
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of power and domination will we come to understand 
how bodies are materialized. For him, all categories 
of personhood — from women to children to the 
disabled, from Bronze Age warriors to the Alpine Late 
Neolithic ‘ice man’ — are seen as modern western 
constructions that have no bearing on the ways in 
which difference was constructed in the past (Thomas 
2004a, 140–48; 2004b, 32–4). Thomas (2004a, 145–6) 
criticizes Hodder (2000, 27), not unreasonably, for 
viewing the ‘ice man’ as a rugged individualist, but 
his own view is worth quoting in full: ‘… we could 
equally argue that [the ice man’s] materialisation on 
the Alps was the outcome of a network of relationships 
that together constituted him as a specific kind of person, 
able to act and understand the world in a particular way’ 
(emphasis added). In our reading, these words speak 
to the existence of an individual acting upon shared 
social traditions of knowledge but in a specific manner 
within a definitive context.
For Thomas, there is something even worse than 
neglecting to consider how difference was viewed in 
the past: ‘[w]ithout power, we return to the liberal view 
of the social as something that we can enter from the 
outside, by free choice’, thus giving the social priority 
over the subject (Thomas 2002b, 38). Liberal humanism 
is Thomas’s bogeyman, and a de-politicized ‘liberal 
archaeology’, wherein the personal is severed from 
the political, is his greatest worry. Such concerns seek 
refuge in the (often justified) postprocessual angst over 
the modern political implications of archaeology, but 
seem insensitive to attempts to study the material con-
ditions of prehistoric individuals, persons, relational 
selves and social identities discussed by Meskell and 
others. Even Thomas (2004b, 138) admits that ‘[i]t is 
“common sense” to think of oneself as an individual, 
and I do not exclude myself from this generalisation. 
It requires a counter-intuitive effort to think anything 
else’. But perhaps we do not need to think quite as 
counter-intuitively as Thomas believes, because the 
crux of the matter is how we understand power —what 
it is ‘to have power’ — and in particular to what extent 
we assume that individual people can have power.
Power, practice and agency
Power was introduced into the social science equation 
as early as the 1970s by theorists such as Raymond 
Williams, Michel Foucault and James Scott (Ortner 
2006, 4–8), all of whom explicitly posed the question: 
how pervasive is power? In other words, they were 
concerned with the extent to which people can decide 
for themselves how to behave or at least deviate from 
the social norm and, indeed, think critically about 
themselves and their situation. In Hodder’s (2003, 84) 
view, agency came to be seen in terms of the material 
and informational resources that gave people ‘the 
power to act’. Foucault, in line with his focus on power 
as a primarily institutional phenomenon, adopted the 
extreme position that power is all-pervasive, totally 
suffusing people’s lives. When transposed to the 
debate over individuals, it is not difficult to see that 
the logical conclusion could only be to deny people 
much if any individuality.
Quite different perspectives were proposed by 
Williams and Scott (see Ortner 2006, 6–7 for a brief sum-
mary). While the latter took the diametrically opposed 
view that individual people may always reserve a cer-
tain measure of autonomy and thereby preserve their 
individuality, the former developed an intermediate 
position, taking the lead from Gramsci’s notions of 
‘hegemony’ and ‘subaltern consciousness’ (discussion 
in Mitchell 1990). Since the 1970s, most anthropologists 
and many archaeologists in their wake have tended 
to assume positions somewhere along this axis but 
generally away from the extremes. Along with them, 
we would insist on the crucial if somewhat complex 
triangle of relationships between people’s desires and 
motives, structural constraints and the unintended 
outcomes of their actions (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992, 
10–37; Ortner 2001; cf. Gardner 2004a, 3–6).
No one, we believe, would deny that people both 
past and present have always had and will continue 
to have their own specific desires and motives, even if 
these were dictated to varying degrees by hegemonic 
structures and might regularly have led to unintended 
consequences. If so, then this observation fundamen-
tally undermines the separation Thomas would make 
between individual identity and social power rela-
tions (see above). Taking our lead from Gramsci and 
Bourdieu (see next section), we suggest instead that 
power relations cannot be privileged or separated out, 
because they are inextricably entangled with identity, 
autonomy and consciousness as well as gender and 
class, albeit to varying degrees. As Antonio Gramsci 
insisted, every social group, no matter how exploited 
or dominated, has their own ‘conception of the world, 
even if only embryonic’ that allows them to influence 
these power relations (Quaderni 11.12; Gerratana 1975, 
1379; cf. Hoare & Nowell Smith 1971, 327).
For the present discussion, the key question is 
therefore whether this amounts to or presupposes 
any individual awareness. This issue was addressed 
by Henrietta Moore from a different perspective in 
response to papers in a recent volume exploring the 
diversity of approaches to agency and individuality in 
archaeology (Dobres & Robb 2000). In her epilogue to 
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the book, Moore ponders the epistemological neces-
sity of assuming that ‘individuals’ in the past were 
‘competent social actors’ and thus at least endowed 
with agency. We quote from her text in fragments as 
she takes up the several points outlined above (Moore 
2000, 259–61, emphasis added).
The influence of Foucault in all the social sciences 
and humanities has produced a formal commitment 
to the notion that the self is not ontologically prior to 
the relations in which it finds itself; it is therefore cul-
turally and historically constructed and formed. … 
The social engagement archaeologists have with the 
people they study is through the ethical spaces cre-
ated by the pre-theoretical assumptions and values 
that make the discipline and its practice possible. … 
One such value … is that individuals in other times 
and other places were endowed with human charac-
teristics, and thus archaeologists cannot reconstruct 
their lives or social systems without assuming that 
people in the past were competent social actors. … In 
spite of all the talk of the importance of not assuming 
that individuals, persons, selves and subjectivities 
are constant or consonant across space and through 
time, it does indeed turn out that agency is crucial 
in the past because it is significant in the present. 
But the past has never been just about the past; it 
has always been what makes the present able to live 
with itself. And we could not live with ourselves if our 
archaeology produced accounts of individuals, cultures, 
and societies that left no space for individuality, freedom 
of choice, will, self-determination, creativity, innovation, 
and resistance. No archaeologist could live with such a 
view because humans would then have no role, or very 
little, in the making of their own history.
emphasized the intentionality of agents and of agency 
in general (Gardner 2004a, 6; 2004b, 33–5). While this 
makes perfect sense in a twentieth-century western 
setting dominated by individualist agents, it may be 
rather less relevant to pre-modern contexts, as there 
is no reason why this particular western conception 
of agency should apply universally. If we want to 
preserve a notion of agency that is meaningful in non-
western contexts both past and present, then we have 
to distance ourselves from some of the assumptions 
that come with Giddens’s version of agency. Instead 
we need to recognize that agency is socially and cul-
turally constructed and consequently variable (Ortner 
2006, 136–7), just as much as any notion of personhood 
is a product of its social and cultural context. Whether 
personhood is constructed in individual, dividual or 
other relational terms is, moreover, a culturally spe-
cific matter that needs to be examined in its own right 
in the relevant social context, bearing in mind that ‘we 
must be careful to totalize neither the “dividual” or 
the “individual”’ (Jones 2005, 196).
In order to counter-balance the individualistic 
emphasis of Giddens’s (western) modernist notion 
of agency and the prominent role it plays in his 
structuration model, we propose to shift attention 
to Bourdieu’s practice theory, because it adds to the 
discursive choices explicit attention to the unconscious 
and internalized dispositions, perceptions and prac-
tices that are shared between socially and culturally 
constituted groups of people, and that generate 
the patterned behaviour of these groups. Key to 
Bourdieu’s theory is the concept of habitus, which may 
be defined as generative schemes that produce regular 
but non-binding and goal-directed but not necessar-
ily conscious, habitual practices and representations 
(Bourdieu 1977, 72; 1990, 52–65; cf. Bentley 1987, 28). 
Basically habitus enables people to create an intel-
ligible, common-sense world imbued with meaning. 
Like learning a language, one can gain various levels 
of competence with varying degrees — if any at all 
— of conscious awareness of the structure(s) involved. 
Without losing sight of the larger structures of society, 
habitus has been characterized as having ‘“grounded” 
cultural processes – discourses, representations … 
— in the social relations of people “on the ground”’ 
(Ortner 2006, 3; more generally 1–18).
For social archaeologists, the concept of habitus is 
attractive because it holds forth the promise of present-
ing a materially constructed world, one that generates 
but equally constrains the everyday (conscious or 
unconscious) social experiences of human actors. 
Dietler & Herbich (1998, 245–8), for example, argue that 
a dynamic theory of material culture — as a social phe-
Of course, on the one hand, archaeologists can and 
have produced top-down, systemic views of the past 
that leave little room for individuals in the senses we 
are concerned with in this study. On the other hand, 
if archaeologists wish to examine the ways that past 
peoples experienced themselves, and how such expe-
rience was situated in cultural attitudes and social 
structures, we must accept that people in the past were 
capable of acting as social agents and, crucially, were 
aware of themselves as persons, whether or not we want 
to call them ‘individuals’.
Habitus, practice and agents
We thus return to the point made at the start of this 
article, namely that much of the controversy appears 
to stem from the connection made by many archae-
ologists between agency and individuals. Part of the 
problem is the Anglophone focus on agency as pro-
posed by Anthony Giddens, who primarily focused on 
interactions between individuals and, as a sociologist, 
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nomenon — should account for and actually transcend 
both structure and agency by showing how the two are 
mediated through practice. In other words, we should 
be able to understand how individual human actors 
are conditioned or constrained by social structure, and 
in turn how specific practices reshape social structure 
as much as they reproduce it. For Dietler & Herbich, 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus offers just such a frame-
work by integrating material culture and its production 
techniques (châines opératoires) with the individuals 
responsible for making and transforming material 
culture. Reproducing material culture thus becomes 
more realistically situated in people’s social life, and 
the dispositions that stimulate social action are formed 
together in the course of practice. From such a perspec-
tive, habitus is a dynamic relational phenomenon that 
is both historical product and agent: it enables us to 
see how specific practices reproduce and transform 
structures as they adjust to social demands.
Of particular relevance to our discussion of 
individuals is that the ‘material conditions of exist-
ence’ — which Bourdieu (1977, 91) termed ‘the mind 
born of the world of objects’ and which help agents to 
shape and reproduce their habitus — are defined less 
in terms of individual practice than of fundamental 
structures. Habitus is not an individual ‘feature’ of 
some sort, because the dispositions can only exist in 
and amongst the actions of people who reproduce 
them. Unlike agency, habitus is indeed only loosely 
associated with (discursive) intentionality and instead 
closely connected to the wider circumstances (‘struc-
tures’) in which people live their lives and decide their 
actions (Silliman 2001, 192–6). More than anything 
else, it is about the relations between people and their 
social context, and about giving meaning to it — how 
people conceive of themselves is part and parcel of 
these relational indices (Jones 2005, 195–200).
People may have acted at times in singular roles 
within their households, communities, landscapes 
and polities, even in their attempts to communicate 
directly with the divine, but the crucial point is that 
they always remained members of and participated in 
social ‘collectivities’ (Meskell 1999, 22). There are two 
levels at work here, both ontologically and materi-
ally. On the first and broader, more malleable social 
level, identities are framed and defined by formal 
associations (relations) or rules of conduct. On the 
second, more fixed personal level, an individual may 
experience multiple identities, but within a single 
subjectivity (Meskell 2001, 189, 193).
Archaeologists confront both of these entangled 
levels as they struggle to come to terms with concepts 
of (individual) actors and agency, especially agency vs 
structure. As Barrett (2001, 149) has noted, obviously 
with some concern about archaeological debates over 
individuals: ‘Certainly individuals act as agents and 
certainly agency operates through the bodies of indi-
viduals, but [the concept of] agency must also include 
the operation of collectivities extending beyond the 
individual’s body and their own lifespan’. We would 
like to take this one step further, and on the one hand 
recognize that people in the past — as today — were 
conscious of themselves in one way or another. On the 
other hand we would also emphasize that we should 
focus less on these individuals or dividuals, and 
more on the ‘parameters’ of their actions that set the 
‘alternatives and limitations for an individual in any 
given social setting’ (Silliman 2001, 192). To give the 
final word once again to Moore (1990, 111; also cited 
in Meskell 1999, 31): ‘… the social world is made up 
of individuals who speak and act in meaningful ways; 
these individuals create the social world which gives 
them their identity and being’.
Conclusions: an alternative take on individuals
Because hegemony and subliminal forces like habitus 
influence human behaviour and the way that we 
‘know’ and engage with the world, one may ques-
tion the meaning and indeed the relevance of the 
notion of the ‘individual’. Although archaeologists 
thus need to move beyond the concept of ‘agency’ 
in understanding social practice, we should not lose 
sight of the ‘sensual and experiential person’ (David 
2005, 194). In our view, archaeologists can only benefit 
by acknowledging the social, spatial and ideological 
significance of individual persons, and of individual 
embodied lives, in both prehistoric and historical 
contexts. It is Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, we argue, 
that offers precisely this link between the subjective, 
internal experience of individual people’s identity, and 
the objective, external social context of their lives. Indi-
vidual human beings, persons and indeed ‘dividuals’ 
belong to multiple social groups that are themselves 
aggregates of individuals and in which they are situ-
ationally active or inactive (Snow 2002, 170). Habitus, 
we argue, ‘embeds’ people’s activities in the fabric of 
their society by tying it into the communities, kinship 
networks and other ‘collectivities’ in which they are 
involved. The concept of habitus thus enables us both 
to recognize non-western notions of personhood as 
individual, dividual or otherwise and to explore the 
culturally specific frameworks within which people 
acted and perceived each other.
Concepts of and concerning individuals, just 
like those concerning factions, polities and social 
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systems, have always been in flux and continually take 
on new forms. Thus it is important (as both Thomas 
and Meskell might agree) that we consider culturally 
specific constructions of the individual rather than 
imposing our own, western precepts in the attempt 
to understand the past. In this respect, it seems clear 
that the current western fascination with individual-
ism is not just culturally specific but also something 
that could not have happened at any other time in the 
past, as Thomas rightly argues.
Its currency now, however, in the highly 
articulated form of western individualism, cannot 
and should not negate archaeological concerns with 
earlier forms of individuals, persons and identities. 
Experiencing oneself as a living individual, we 
insist, is part of human nature. Beyond this, people 
will have more culturally specific notions of their 
individuality in any given time and place, and will 
hold certain beliefs about their own individual 
natures and capacities. And beyond this lies the 
realm of experiences individually determined and 
dependent on factors such as age, status, sex, class, 
life cycle, ethnicity, identity, religious orientation or 
sexual preference, all of which can and do produce 
individual difference and variation. Even if the rel-
evant parameters of such a framework are deeply 
imbricated in culturally specific modes of thought, 
that does not mean we cannot gain enough distance 
from our own urban, western cultural preconceptions 
to make intelligent enquiries into the human and 
very individual life histories that in their social total 
make up the past. 
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Comments
From Charles Cobb, South Carolina Institute of 
Archaeology & Anthropology, University of South 
Carolina, Columbia, SC 29204, USA; cobbcr@gwm.
sc.edu
I am largely in agreement with the authors, and will 
concern myself with what I see as the larger context 
of their arguments. Although their discussion centres 
on the meaning and relevance of the ‘individual’ in 
archaeology, in my mind the real question is as to 
how we are to address the meaning and relevance 
of modernity in our work. Knapp & van Dommelen 
effectively make the case that one can experience 
individuality and self-critical awareness in many his-
torical contexts, yet they still have left Julian Thomas 
and others in control of the terms of the debate, that 
is, modernity is a Western-dominated construct that 
has fostered a qualitative shift in the way that people 
view their place in the world.
In broad contour, this is a compelling argument 
that offers a useful point of departure for the pursuit 
of a critical archaeology. Yet, on the ground — in the 
places where people live and how they live — this 
thesis is difficult to maintain if it is reduced to a series 
of related axioms concerning Western domination: 
that modernity is about spatial discipline, about faith 
in technological progress, about the rise of the indi-
vidual, and so on. The difficulty with this characteri-
zation is that it leaves unquestioned the nature of the 
interactions between West, East, South and North that 
we associate with the rise of the West beginning in the 
1400s ad. Modernity may have a strong Western bent 
but it developed in a world-wide arena of mutualism. 
Marshall Sahlins (1993) describes an ‘indigenization 
of modernity’ to impart a sense of this historical 
hybridity. Recognition of this has led many workers 
to undertake research that explores the negotiation 
— rather than the simple imposition — of modernity 
(e.g. Berman 1982; Ong 1996). Ensuing from this idea 
25
Rethinking Individuals and Agents in Archaeology
is an entire cottage industry that has addressed ‘multi-
ple’, ‘alterior’ and ‘parallel’ modernities. If modernity 
is so nebulous, it becomes difficult to maintain that its 
constitutive elements — self-determining individuals 
— are any less so.
In the essentialized view of modernity and its 
precepts — so commonly adopted in contrast to the 
pluralized view — one is reminded of the path that 
modes of production took under structural marxism. 
Capitalism was seen to penetrate or articulate with 
indigenous modes, but it was always monolithic and 
it always existed outside of lived experience. To be 
fair to Julian Thomas, singled out for critique in this 
article because of his vocal stand on these issues, his 
work does show that he has grappled with these 
nuances. In Archaeology and Modernity, he emphasizes 
that modernity is a heterogeneous process rather than 
a thing, but in some passages this process is defined 
by its Western source rather than its dialogical nature: 
‘modernity has become something plural, as fragments 
of the Western framework have been assimilated and 
recontextualised by different communities’ (Thomas 
2004a, 51). I would suggest that modernity has always 
been plural, even as the Western framework itself has 
been continually recontextualized by its interactions 
with communities worldwide. 
This is not to deny that modernity can be rec-
ognized by historical tendencies (back to discipline, 
technology, progress, and the importance of the 
autonomous individual); but it is also a cultural 
representation that is not to be confused with lived 
experience. While I believe that the construction of 
the self in the last five centuries may be increasingly 
defined by modernist tendencies in many areas of the 
world, we need to be wary of generalizations about 
the nature of the individual in either the pre-modern 
or modern eras. Such generalizations are useful for 
laying a framework for research, but they need to 
be constantly critiqued, re-evaluated and refined. 
Micro-economics textbooks may assume the rational 
individual and decision-maker, government bodies 
may develop policies based on this principle, and 
neo-liberal thinkers may argue for its universality, but 
the contingency of history always undermines such 
constructs as it does the meta-construct of modernity. 
Indeed, this is, I believe, the argument for empirical 
investigation of the (person:self:individual) made by 
Knapp & van Dommelen. Western beliefs regarding 
the autonomous individual have been translated into 
reifying institutions and practices which, in the United 
States, range from interest rate decisions made by 
the Federal Reserve Board to beer advertisements on 
television. The interesting question is not how this 
‘structure’ contributes to a transcendental Western 
individualizing ethos, but how such an ethos has been 
rendered into local mores. Likewise, the challenge for 
archaeologists is to develop ways of understanding the 
other forms of relational networks that contributed to 
the constitution of selfhood in the pre-modern era.
From Dean J. Saitta, Department of Anthropology, 
University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208, USA; 
dsaitta@du.edu. 
Agency theories in archaeology developed, in part, as 
a corrective to the often bloodless models of social life 
and change produced by various systems-theoretical 
and other processual approaches. Their development 
has been a good thing for the discipline. Agency 
theories have put people back into culture along with 
the cognitive factors — for instance, the frameworks 
of meaning by which people assign significance to 
events and things — that inform and motivate their 
actions. They have moved us to think about the free-
dom or ’relative autonomy‘ that individuals have to 
manoeuvre within cultural systems and structures of 
social power. They have reunited society with history. 
In so doing, agency theories have rediscovered a key 
insight of the older culture history approach that 
dominated archaeological thinking before the advent 
of processual archaeology: that the particulars of local 
historical context are worth investigating for their own 
sake, rather than simply serving as fodder for sweep-
ing evolutionary narratives driven by cultural laws. 
It was just a matter of time, however, before the 
concept of human agency would itself come under 
fire. Charles Orser (2003, 131), worried that agency 
had become an ’all inclusive buzzword‘ for archaeolo-
gists, covering so many diverse human actions that the 
term was ’rapidly acquiring non-meaning’. Critiques 
of agency start with the observation that individual 
agency is just one form of agency (Johnson 1989; 
Hodder & Hutson 2003). Thomas (2000a), drawing 
on Foucault, notes that the idea of the autonomous 
individual exercising rational choice and free will is 
a relatively recent invention, specific to modernity. He 
argues that humans always carry out their projects in 
the context of a concrete material world that includes 
other people. Thus, it is inadequate to consider human 
beings apart from the relationships in which they find 
themselves. Barrett (2001) agrees, noting that agency 
must include the operation of social collectives that 
extend beyond the individual’s own body and life-
span. Indeed, Johannes Fabian (1994) has noted that 
human acting is always acting in company. Hodder 
(2004) helpfully suggests that agency, like power, is 
less a thing we possess than a capacity that we exer-
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cise. With Thomas, he sees the group as forming part 
of the resources used for individual agency, and thus 
views group behaviour as another form of individual 
agency. 
McGuire & Wurst (2002) push the critique of 
agency theory the farthest, from the standpoint of an 
explicitly activist archaeology that seeks to engage 
with the political present. They argue that theories 
of individual agency in post-processual archaeology 
are as ideological as the cultural systems theories 
that preceded them. They identify the focus on the 
individual agent as a sustaining belief of modern capi-
talism: capitalism depends for its survival on cultural 
processes that constitute people as free and unfettered 
individuals; so it works, through its cultural forms, to 
universalize this historically contingent idea. Where 
this ideology is internalized and taken for granted, it 
obscures the oppositional nature of class groupings 
and exploitation in society. It also produces the kind 
of self-serving ’identity politics‘ that can fragment 
and debilitate collective movements for change. Thus, 
McGuire & Wurst find advocacy of individual agency 
models by scholars intending to use their research to 
challenge class, gender and racial inequalities in the 
modern world to be misguided and contradictory. 
By embracing the logic, language, and symbolism of 
individual agency, activist scholars are in fact reinforc-
ing that which they wish to critique. By projecting 
and universalizing that which is contingent, they help 
to propagate existing social relations. This notion of 
agency lacks transformative, emancipatory and revo-
lutionary potential (Harvey 1973).
Alternatively — and building on McGuire & 
Wurst — we can see individuals as always thoroughly 
enmeshed in a web of social relations. Collective action 
results from the shared consciousness or solidarity 
that defines a community of individuals. Such con-
sciousness may be based in class, gender, ethnicity, 
race, age, physical ability or some combination of 
these identities. People make history as members of 
social groups whose common consciousness derives 
from shared existential anxieties, political interests 
and social relations. To the extent that these anxieties, 
interests and relations are traceable to larger forces like 
global capitalism, and to the extent that community is 
always a delicate relation between fluid processes of 
self-identification and relatively permanent associa-
tions like that between person and nation-state (Har-
vey 2000, 240), archaeology needs grand narratives of 
the structural and long term as well as small narratives 
of lived moments (Hodder 1999, 147).
 The critiques of agency noted above usefully 
respond to Orser’s concern. The paper by Knapp & 
van Dommelen does likewise. I appreciate Knapp & 
van Dommelen’s survey of the theoretical landscape 
and their call, informed by Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus, for a more flexible approach to the question 
of agency. The task today — one that is clearly identi-
fied by Knapp & van Dommelen — is to sort out and 
better theorize agency’s many variable dimensions. 
We need to analyse the broad social relationships 
and material conditions that produce agents with 
particular subjectivities, and study the social processes 
used within specific cultural formations at particular 
moments in time in order to negotiate and coordinate 
group behaviour and consensus. In so doing we will 
be better positioned to identify those subjectivities and 
collectivities in the past that might have relevance for 
informing political action in the present. 
From Julian Thomas, School of Arts, Histories & 
Cultures, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, 
Manchester, M13 9PL, England; julian.thomas@man-
chester.ac.uk.
Bernard Knapp & Peter van Dommelen are to be 
applauded for attempting to clarify the continuing 
debate on individuals and agency in archaeology. 
Their intention is to seek consensus in a polarized 
argument, and to establish a middle position which 
places individuals into a social context. However, I 
believe that in so doing they are misguided, for the 
divisions of opinion that they identify are not trivial, 
but grounded in fundamentally different philosophi-
cal positions. Their argument threatens to obscure 
important conceptual distinctions, and to muddle the 
terminology that gives us purchase on the material 
that we study. The question of whether or not the term 
‘individual’ is a universal one, which can be applied 
to people throughout history, is lodged in the broader 
confrontation between essentialist views of humanity 
and their critics. On the one hand, there is the belief 
that human beings have an essential and unchanging 
nature, so that they represent entities with a range of 
attributes, and, on the other, the position that ‘being 
human’ is a practice — something that one does rather 
than something that one is by virtue of possessing a 
range of formal characteristics.
When people in the contemporary western 
world use the word ’individual’, they are generally 
(at least implicitly) invoking a conception of what it 
is to be human which gradually emerged between the 
fifteenth and seventeenth centuries ad. This image of 
the person combines autonomy, agency, finitude, pri-
mordiality and irreducibility. The modern individual 
is understood as a mortal instance of a trans-historic 
entity (’Man’), endowed with a range of qualities 
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(principally reason) which constitute ‘human nature’ 
and which are pre-given, prior to any context of inter-
action. As such, individuals are irreducible and self-
contained social atoms who come together to create 
collectivities through their willed action. Individuals 
are the authors of their own acts, which originate in 
the immaterial interior spaces of their minds, so that 
thought precedes action. Yet this model of the human 
is, to borrow Judith Butler’s term, a regulatory fic-
tion, an imagined mirror in relation to which people 
constitute themselves. No-one ever achieves the ideal 
of ‘being the individual’, for they can never stand free 
of society; they always find themselves already imbri-
cated in social relations and condemned to use shared 
linguistic concepts in order to express themselves. As 
Knapp & van Dommelen rightly point out, even in the 
contemporary West, human identities are multiple and 
fragmented, so that in-dividuality is never complete. It 
has been the achievement of philosophy, anthropology 
and social history over the past century to demonstrate 
that this vision of humanity is specific to a particular 
place and time.
Knapp & van Dommelen complain that I per-
sistently tend to read other people’s use of the term 
‘individual’ as ’individualism’. The problem is that we 
are using the language in rather different ways. It is 
virtually impossible to employ the term ‘individual’ 
without tacitly implying the kind of personhood 
referred to above. I have been very careful to distin-
guish between ‘the individual’ and ‘individualism’ 
(Thomas 2004a, 139–40): the individual is a particular 
conception of what it is to be a human being, which 
characterizes western modernity; individualism is a 
discourse which seeks to celebrate and valorize the 
individual, and which developed at a later stage, as 
Lukes’s (1973) classic text details. These are distinct 
phenomena, and we need the two terms to distin-
guish between them. Knapp & van Dommelen seek 
to subsume both under the heading, ’individualism’, 
which can only harm the precision of our language 
(see Fig. 1 for a representation of our respective uses 
of terminology).
Knapp & van Dommelen appear to be using 
the term ‘individual’ in a less specific way than I do, 
to refer to a singular, embodied, self-aware human 
agent. As such, it becomes more or less interchange-
able with ‘human being’ or ’person’. I am not sure 
why we need so many locutions that mean much 
the same thing. Potential confusion is created in the 
process, for, according to their definition, those forms 
of humanity that are generally distinguished from 
individuality, such as partible and permeable person-
hood (Strathern 1988; Busby 1997), are incorporated 
into individuality. That proposition that dividuals can 
be individuals too seems problematic, for such people 
are embodied, self-aware agents who do not consider 
themselves to be irreducible or possessed of pre-social 
qualities. Similarly, when Knapp & van Dommelen list 
a series of ways in which archaeologists can identify 
individuals in the past (as bodies, iconographic repre-
sentations, or named personages), it is only singularity 
that is being identified, not individuality. The ques-
tion of how a Sumerian king might have understood 
himself is fascinating, but we cannot assume that he 
was an ‘individual’ simply because he had a specific 
name and a particular body. This is precisely where 
‘contemporary fixations’ do bear on these examples, 
for, by employing the term ‘individual’, we invite 
the inevitable slippage between the general and the 
specific sense of the word, and invoke the mass of 
cultural baggage that comes with it.
Equally, the wealth of case studies that Knapp 
& van Dommelen cite which treat ’the individual in 
the past’ hover between the specific and the general. 
In what sense is the occupant of a single grave or the 
maker of a pot an individual? Is it just as unique social 
actors, or as people who understood their bodies, acts, 
and relationship to society in the way that we do in the 
modern West? Presumably it is the former, but when 
archaeologists refer to ‘the rise of the individual’ is 
there not necessarily a hint of the latter? The danger 
then is of a past in which ‘the rise of the individual’ 
takes place again and again, in innumerable contexts, 
and so the process is robbed of its specificity.
Knapp & van Dommelen stress the way that 
western social science concentrates on the collective 
rather than the individual but this is a recent develop-
ment, principally attributable to Durkheim. A more 
deeply embedded tradition of thought, which goes 
back as far as Hobbes and beyond, identifies society 
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Figure 1. Contrasting use of the terminology of 
‘individuals’ by Thomas and Knapp & van Dommelen.
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as a form of contract established between individuals 
who, in the first instance, float free from any relational 
context. I would argue that it is more often the latter 
that is responsible for our implicit expectations of 
what people and society should be like. This would 
appear to be the case with Knapp & van Dommelen 
themselves, for, in addressing Bourdieu’s invaluable 
concept of the habitus, they seem to indicate that 
people’s freely willed actions need to be ‘embedded’ 
in social contexts, as if they were in the first instance 
asocial. The reverse is the case: the social contexts that 
people always already find themselves within at once 
initiate and sustain their ability to act.
Knapp & van Dommelen appear to be commit-
ted to an essentialist perspective, to judge from both 
their acceptance of the idea of ‘human nature’ and 
their account of power as primarily a limitation on the 
exercise of free will. Their statement that ‘Experienc-
ing oneself as a living individual is part of human 
nature’ (p. 24) appears to contradict their expressed 
scepticism over an ‘unchanging humanity in the past’, 
but they resolve this difficulty by resorting to a variant 
of the traditional humanist model of a person ‘built 
in layers’ (Heidegger 1993, 227). In their particular 
case, this involves the notion that there is a fixed and 
transcendental core of human nature, onto which 
more historically and culturally variable elements are 
freighted. By implication, this ‘core’ is pre-social and 
fundamental, while multiple identities and statuses 
are inscribed on its surface by society. It follows from 
this that ‘human nature’ is ungendered or pre-sexual, 
and that sex or gender is a relatively superficial ele-
ment ‘added on top’. Some feminists would find this 
view severely problematic. The alternative is to argue 
that humans have no pre-social existence and no fun-
damental nature, and that they discover themselves in 
their totality through a process of self-understanding 
which is socially initiated (see Butler 1997, 33).
The matrix within which the initiation of human 
subjects takes place is that of power relations. Perhaps 
the most worrying aspect of Knapp & van Domme-
len’s article is the curious account that they provide 
of Foucault’s view of power. I simply cannot under-
stand how anyone who has read his work can refer to 
Foucault’s ‘binary equation of oppressor vs oppressed’ 
(p. 20). As I understand it, such a perspective was pre-
cisely what he set out to challenge. Foucault’s insist-
ence on the pervasiveness of power has to be under-
stood in the context of his complete re-evaluation of 
the concept. For Foucault, power is never the binary 
relationship between the powerful and the powerless. 
It is never merely restrictive, but also productive of 
knowledge and pleasure (Foucault 1979, 7). Contrary 
to Knapp & van Dommelen’s expressed view, power 
is not an object or entity that people ‘have’ or ’hold’, 
but a web or circuit of relations that people inhabit 
and exercise. All social relations are power relations, 
for they bear within them the potential for realizing 
some actions and constraining others. Power relations 
include those between lovers, friends, and partners. 
Power relations can be democratic and balanced, and 
based on apprenticeship, solicitude or desire. With-
out power there is no possibility for action: a society 
without power relations is impossible (Foucault 1982, 
220). As the regicides, Jacobins and Bolsheviks dis-
covered to their cost, one cannot simply chop off the 
king’s head, remove the central authority, and create 
a society without power. Instead, one should strive 
to make power relations more democratic. Foucault’s 
view of power is not that it is a ‘primarily institutional 
phenomenon’ (p. 21), or at least not universally so. 
Instead, he attempts to distinguish the radically differ-
ent forms that power relations have taken at different 
points in history. His concern with ’bio-power’ in high 
modernity, the way that the wellbeing of the subject 
becomes enmeshed in the capillary institutions of the 
state, is the ground of his criticism of a binary model 
of power, which was itself a product of the feudal 
world (Foucault 1988; McNay 1994, 118). This latter is 
what he refers to as the ’juridico-discursive’ model of 
power (Foucault 1978, 88). Yet he argues that entirely 
different forms of power existed in the ancient world. 
These views form part of a sustained and profound 
critique of modernity, so that to describe Foucault’s 
work as merely ‘part of the modernist discourse’ (p. 
20) is highly questionable.
For Knapp & van Dommelen, it appears that 
the question of the omnipresence of power relations 
is primarily a matter of the restriction of agency. This 
again reveals their commitment to the idea of a pre-
social human agent (or ’individual’). It should be clear 
that in the Foucauldian scheme of things there can be 
no agency without power. Yet such a view is relatively 
congruent with the ideas of Bourdieu, which Knapp 
& van Dommelen appear to approve. Bourdieu was, 
after all, a practice theorist, who sought to question 
the existence of fixed structures underlying the play 
of social life. The habitus, in his account, is a set of 
inherited cultural dispositions which facilitate the 
unconsidered improvisations that make up everyday 
life. Clearly, the reproduction of the habitus will be 
intimately implicated in the power relations of a given 
society. We might go so far as to say that the habitus is 
one of the many things that power produces.
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Singular views
We thank the commentators for their thoughts on our 
discussion of past practices, agents and individuals. In 
particular we welcome them as an important first step 
in recognizing that this debate should benefit by being 
viewed from a wider perspective — or indeed perspec-
tives, as the three respondents run the gamut from 
American Marxists and postprocessualists to British 
deconstructivists. However, because our goal was, 
and remains, to give a new direction to this debate 
over the existence of individuals in the past, it would 
be counter-productive to engage further in labelling 
individuals in the present or to continue pursuing 
the rather unhelpful polarization that typically has 
characterized exchanges on this subject. 
Because we are convinced we should acknowl-
edge and indeed take seriously the rich array of iden-
tifications of self and others that people constructed 
in the past, we prefer to concentrate on the multiple 
and multi-faceted connections between people’s sub-
jective perceptions of themselves and others, on the 
one hand, and the social contexts in which they con-
structed these meanings, on the other. As we argued 
in the second half of our paper, Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus provides the theoretical pivot onto which our 
understanding of individual or ‘dividual’ practices 
and shared perceptions may be pegged. Focusing our 
efforts on the specific details of particular case studies 
and keeping an open mind about what may or may 
not have been possible therefore seems to us the way 
forward in this debate.
As stated in our article, we accept Thomas’s 
point that post-Enlightenment and Modernist thought 
(which are not identical) has shaped much of our 
understanding of the past, including how people 
thought about themselves. But this cannot be taken 
in any absolute sense, if only because it has also been 
argued that ‘we have never been modern’ (Latour 1993). 
While anthropologists, sociologists and geographers 
generally confirm the western roots of modernity, they 
also emphasize its historical character and intimate 
connections to specific economic developments and 
thus tend to blur the distinction between modernity 
and pre- or non-modern societies (see e.g. Berman 
1982; Anderson 1984; Miller 1994, 58–81; Rowlands 
1995). As postcolonial theorists have pointed out, the 
whole idea that modernity marked a fundamental and 
clean break with the pre-modern past and contem-
porary non-modern societies bears all the spurious 
hallmarks of evolutionist and one-sided colonialist 
or ‘occidentalist’ thinking (Mignolo 2000, 91–126). 
And, from an archaeological perspective, Pluciennik 
(2007, 238) has already challenged Thomas’s (2004a) 
arguments on individuals for ‘mak[ing] too much of 
the contrast between pre-modern and modern’. So, 
whatever we think about the merits of Latour’s claim, 
at the very least it should inspire caution in adopting 
extreme positions or singular views.
Two of our commentators follow up this line 
of thought: Cobb suggests that the core issue is how 
archaeologists can address the meaning and relevance 
of modernity in their work. Rather than being simply 
a construct of the west, he points out that modernity 
developed in a worldwide context of ‘historical hybrid-
ity’, and that we must therefore be careful not to make 
blanket generalizations about the nature of the indi-
vidual, whether in the modern era or in the deep past, 
unless they are constantly critiqued and refined. Saitta, 
too, maintains that agency theories have ‘reunited 
society with history’, and that we must investigate 
the particulars of local historical context on their own 
terms, rather than using them as ‘fodder for sweeping 
evolutionary narratives driven by cultural laws’.
Both these points, we feel, go to the heart of our 
arguments and mesh with our endeavour to overcome 
or at least side-step the entrenched dichotomy that has 
tended to dominate the debate. To suggest, therefore, 
as Thomas does, that we are seeking to establish some 
middle ground or ‘soulless compromise’ is entirely 
beside the point: by widening the binary opposition 
between modernist and non-modernist, effectively 
reifying it into an absolute divide, debate has been 
stopped in its tracks and we gain no further insight 
into the ways people may have understood themselves 
and others in the past. The challenge for archaeology, 
as Cobb concludes and we concur, is to develop new 
ways of understanding the diverse relational networks 
that impacted on the constitution of selfhood in the 
pre-modern era. Saitta, similarly, maintains that the task 
of the archaeologist today is to evaluate the material 
conditions and broader social relationships at particular 
moments in time that produce individual agents with 
distinct subjectivities. Insisting on the absolute differ-
ence of modernity might indeed be seen as privileging 
Western thought and marginalizing alternative repre-
sentations and concepts (see e.g. Schmidt & Patterson 
1995, 4–7, 13–14; Mignolo 2000).
Discourse analysis provides a starting-point for 
this type of analysis; in our view, however, Thomas 
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sees his own analysis as an end-point, while we recog-
nize it as a point of departure for further consideration 
of the myriad problems and pitfalls exposed. Take for 
example the Sumerian king whose singularity Thomas 
acknowledges, but whom he denies individuality. Of 
course we cannot assume that a person such as Enme-
baragesi, king of the Sumerian town of Kish (c. 2600 
bc) and the first man known to be commemorated by 
his own inscription (Cooper 1981, 228; Walker 1987, 
13) thought of himself as an individual. But neither can 
we assume a priori he was not an individual or never 
could have been. We have to engage with the evidence 
at hand, and having textual, emic documents actually 
makes a crucial difference in cases like this one.
In terms of terminology, it is difficult to follow 
Thomas’s discussion. He notes, for example, and we 
would agree, that ‘individual’ and ‘individualism’ 
are distinct phenomena, but we documented at some 
length in our article how Thomas himself has repeat-
edly invoked the concept of ‘individualism’ to criticize 
the work of several other scholars who are discussing 
the concept of ‘the individual’. Thomas goes on to say 
(p. 27) that: ‘Knapp & van Dommelen seek to subsume 
both under the heading “individualism”’ (also in his 
Fig. 1). In fact, like Wilkie & Bartoy (2000, 755, 771), 
we see a clear distinction between the individual and 
‘individualism’ and we reiterate that Thomas’s claim 
— that any appreciation of ‘individuals’ is necessarily 
closely aligned with ‘individualism’ — is an exclu-
sively western stance that goes to the heart of this 
controversy. Indeed, Thomas manages to contradict 
himself in this respect within the space of three lines 
(p. 27): having stated that ‘It is virtually impossible to 
employ the term “individual” without tacitly imply-
ing the kind of personhood referred to above’, he goes 
on to do just that by saying: ‘I have been very careful 
to distinguish between “the individual” and “indi-
vidualism”.’ Moreover, Thomas’s Figure confirms our 
point exactly: he makes a vague distinction between 
conception and discourse, while insisting that both are 
modernist constructs. It is clear that the real distinc-
tion, which for him is far more absolute than for us, 
lies between the self-aware agents in the past and the 
modernist perception or discourse or conception or 
representation of ours. Why does Thomas castigate 
us for having ‘so many locutions’ when he continues 
to insist on making even more distinctions that are far 
from clear, or helpful?
Practice and identity
Terminology is not the only point where Thomas 
misreads our text and misconstrues our arguments. 
In particular, he alleges (p. 28) that we are committed 
to an ‘essentialist perspective’, which goes against 
everything we write, practise and believe, something 
Thomas should have realized based upon our pub-
lished work. He ought to have recognized this, and 
perhaps he did, when he noted our ‘expressed scepti-
cism’ over an ‘unchanging humanity in the past’. To 
say, as we did, that ‘experiencing oneself as a living 
individual is part of human nature’ is not really so 
different from what Thomas (Fig. 1) defines as the 
‘singular, self-aware embodied human agent’.
In light of our overall arguments about habitus 
as enabling people to relate and give meaning to the 
local conditions in which they live(d) their lives, we 
are struggling to make sense of Thomas’s comments. 
We did indeed use the term ‘embedded’ and would 
do so again, because it conveys particularly well the 
notion that perceptions and meanings, including those 
of oneself as an individual, ‘dividual’ or otherwise, 
are not isolated from the wider social and economic 
contexts in which people grow up, acquire values and 
evaluate other people’s actions and ideas. With both 
this description and our original statement that ‘habi-
tus “embeds” people’s activities in the fabric of their 
society by tying it into the communities, kinship net-
works and other “collectivities”’ (p. 23), we sought to 
emphasize that motivations, actions and perceptions 
are not free-floating but constituted by their contexts. 
In consequence, people’s identities cannot be ‘layered’ 
onto a tabula rasa or ‘fixed and transcendental core of 
human nature’ (Thomas, p. 28) because there always 
is an earlier experience or action.
We remain puzzled as to why or how Thomas 
thinks these words may imply ‘freely-willed actions’or 
a ‘core’ that is ‘pre-social and fundamental, while mul-
tiple identities and statuses are inscribed on its surface 
by society’ (p. 28). Indeed, Thomas seems to descend 
into sheer fantasy when he suggests that we must 
feel human nature is ‘ungendered or pre-sexual, and 
that sex or gender is a relatively superficial element 
“added on top”’. Indeed, not only will feminists find 
this view severely problematic, so do we. We never 
stated anything like this, never imagined it, never even 
dreamed it. Had Thomas consulted our published 
range of works, he would have known that one of us, 
at least, holds very feminist views on interpreting both 
the past and the present (e.g. Knapp 1998).
Thomas’s misreading of our text plummets even 
further with his comments on Foucault (p. 28, bottom), 
suggesting that it may be ‘the most worrying aspect’ 
of our paper. In the first place, we do not refer to 
Foucault, but to a ‘Foucauldian archaeology’, quot-
ing Meskell (1996; 1999, 30–31). Here Thomas makes 
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yet another (to us, pointless) digression to critique 
something we never said, whilst at the same time 
continuing to polarize, unnecessarily and unhelpfully, 
the terms used in the debate. Citing Meskell does not 
necessarily mean we are in agreement with Meskell, 
and in any case our point was that Thomas himself 
has situated himself in the realm of a ‘Foucauldian 
archaeology’.
Because our principal interest lies with interpret-
ing the past and because we feel there is little to gain in 
further polarizing this debate, we leave these matters 
as they are and return to the ‘material conditions of 
existence’. As stated at the outset, we prefer to direct 
our efforts towards a more nuanced understanding 
of past perceptions and practices than engaging in 
unhelpful exchanges of who misread what. Indeed, 
what remains unsaid and largely without comment 
so far is what we put forth as an ‘alternative take on 
individuals’. This view, primarily based on Bourdieu’s 
notions of habitus and practice, and coupled with 
insights derived from Foucault and Gramsci (because 
power is never far off when people engage with each 
other), offers one way to appreciate culturally specific 
constructions of personhood and the self without a 
priori assuming or excluding certain dispositions.
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